Political Islam is on the rebound in Indonesia, writes GREG FEALY.

There were two main surprises in the 9 April legislative election in Indonesia.

The first was the poorer than expected performance of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). The second was the higher than predicted vote for Islamic parties. 

In 2009, the total vote for Islamic parties was 29 per cent, the lowest ever recorded.  All major pollsters had forecast an even worse result for the 2014 election, with the Islamic party-vote ranging from around 15 to 25 per cent. 

No survey had Islamic parties improving on their overall performance of five years ago.  But the quick count results from 9 April showed that the five Islamic parties contesting the election had gained about 31 to 32 per cent of the national vote. 

Most of the polls also had four of the five parties experiencing falling support; only the National Awakening Party (PKB) was slated to increase its vote. 

The quick count figures showed that in fact four of the five parties lifted their vote, and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which had been predicted to suffer the biggest drop of all – around three to five per cent – ended up with just a one per cent decline.

So what accounts for this unexpectedly good showing? 

To begin with, there is little to suggest that this was due to a rise in ideological Islam.  None of the four Islamic parties that passed the 3.5 per cent parliamentary threshold – the amount required to secure representation in Indonesia’s national parliament – campaigned using Islamic concepts or doctrines. 

Rather, their appeals to their core constituencies emphasised the practical benefits that they would deliver to their supporters.  For example, PKB and the United Development Party (PPP), both of which have strong bases in the Islamic education system, promised to channel greater resources to Islamic schools and ulama (Islamic scholars). 

Likewise, the National Mandate Party (PAN) sought to win support from its Muhammadiyah constituency by casting itself as a defender of that organisation’s interests. 

Perhaps more significantly, when these parties were making their pitches to national audiences, their messages were invariably inclusive and universalistic, conveyed with the intention of having the broadest possible appeal in the electorate. 

Also, none of these four parties campaigned on sharia (Islamic law) agendas.  The only party that did so was the Crescent-Star Party (PBB), which only gained about 1.5 per cent of the vote and failed to clear the parliamentary threshold.

But, the answer to why Islamic parties improved their position in this election lies not in some collective, across-the-board trend in the Islamic community, but rather in the electoral strategies and campaigning of the individual parties. 

For example, the best performance of any Islamic party was recorded by PKB, which gained a quick count vote of around 9 per cent, up from 4.9 per cent in 2009. 

A number of factors account for its improved showing, the most important of these being the party’s closeness to Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, which had facilitated PKB’s formation in 1998. 

In the 2004 and 2009 elections, relations between NU and PKB were frosty. But a concerted campaign by PKB chairman Muhaimin Iskandar over the past few years had presented the party as unequivocally serving the interests of NU.  The overall effect convinced many NU members that PKB was ‘their’ party and that they should return to the fold. 

PKB was also much better funded than in past and had enjoyed greater internal stability and cohesion than it had in the previous two elections.

Across the other three major Islamic parties, PAN’s vote of around 7.5 per cent surprised both pundits and party leaders.  But, it campaigned well and had a well-funded program of advertisements. The party also mobilised its candidates and cadre to telling effect.  Surveys showed higher voter recognition of PAN’s campaign than for other Islamic parties. 

PKS’ 6.9 per cent quick count figure was the least anticipated of all Islamic party results – particularly after several years of embarrassing corruption and morality scandals in the party, the most damaging of which saw its president jailed for 16 years in early 2014.

The corrupt PKS president was quickly replaced by indefatigable secretary-general, Anis Matta, who immediately began touring the country rallying disillusioned PKS cadre and reaching out to Muslim voters outside the party’s core constituency. 

Cleverly, the party also sought to lessen the relative sins of its own corrupt leaders by establishing a twitter page called ‘KPK Watch’, which highlighted high-level graft in other parties. 

PPP, was the fourth-ranked Islamic party, receiving about 6.5 per cent in the post-election quick count tallies.  Few had expected it to do so well, particularly as the party has the least credible leadership of any Islamic party.

Its good performance would appear to have been due to several factors.  First, PPP had success with the slogan that it was the ‘Great House of the Islamic Community’ (Rumah Besar Umat Islam), appealing to a sense that PPP accommodated all groups within Indonesia’s diverse Muslim society. 

Second, PPP made extensive use of the patronage opportunities that came through its two cabinet members, Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali and Public Housing Minister Djan Faridz.  Both ministries poured vast sums of money into the Islamic education and social service system, ensuring the support of thousands of grateful local Islamic scholars and leaders. 

Last of all, although PPP avoided campaigning on Islamist issues such as sharia implementation and the banning of ‘deviant’ sects like the Shia and Ahmadiyah, it was nonetheless seen in many conservative parts of the electorate as the party which best captured their aspirations.

So, Islamic parties may not be in terminal decline as many have predicted and they are likely to have a little more clout in the next government than they did in the previous one.  But these results have been greeted more with relief than elation in Islamic parties and questions remain about their longer-term competitiveness – particularly if, as seems likely, the majority of observant Muslim voters continue to find mainstream non-Islamic parties such as Golkar and PDI-P more attractive than Islamic parties.

This election result does not show a resurgence of political Islam but it does indicate the resilience of Islamic parties and their ability to adapt to changing attitudes in the electorate. 

The four Islamic parties that have gained parliamentary seats have done so partly because they have moved closer to the centre of the political spectrum, and away from a doctrinaire Islamic position.  They are increasingly pragmatic, in keeping with the mood of the electorate. 

Their form of Islamic politics is not a religiously driven program of political action but rather an overlay of communal identity and sectoral interest.

Associate Professor Greg Fealy is head of the Department of Political and Social Change at the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.

This article forms part of New Mandala’s coverage of the Indonesian elections.